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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal we conclude that the United States Navy's 
failure to provide routine safeguards on a footpath leading 
to a structure under its control does not implicate the 
discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Therefore, the claim of 
personal injury based on the plaintiff's fall on the path 
satisfies the jurisdictional facet of the Act and the judgment 
dismissing the complaint will be reversed. 
 
At the time of the accident, plaintiff, Sheila Gotha, was 
an employee of the Martin-Marietta Company, which was 
performing work for the Navy at the land base of the 
Underwater Tracking Range located on St. Croix, Virgin 
Islands. The facility consists of upper and lower sites 
separated by a public road. 
 
On February 20, 1994, at approximately 5:00 a.m., 
plaintiff was walking from the upper portion of the facility 
to the lower sector to deliver material to an office trailer. 
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She and a co-employee took the unpaved path that led 
directly to the trailer. The path was approximately fifteen to 
twenty feet in length and dropped downward at an angle of 
approximately fifty-four degrees. There was no lighting in 
the area, and as plaintiff descended the path in the 
darkness, she fell and injured her ankle. 
 
Plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80, alleging negligence on 
the part of the government in failing to provide a safe 
access to the trailer. Specifically, her complaint alleged that 
the government was negligent in failing to provide a 
stairway with handrails and for neglecting to provide 
sufficient lighting at the scene. The district court, however, 
dismissed the action based on lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, concluding that the government was protected 
by sovereign immunity because the conduct alleged came 
within the discretionary function exception to liability 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
 
Based on testimony of Navy personnel, the court rejected 
the government's first defense of delegation of responsibility 
to Martin-Marietta for the condition of the premises. After 
analyzing the discretionary function exception, the court 
decided that no statute or regulation mandated the Navy to 
make the repairs or undertake the construction measures 
that plaintiff alleged were necessary. 
 
The court, however, determined that the exception 
applied because the Navy had based its decision not to 
improve the path on "a complex set of policy imperatives." 
These factors included "the effect of any construction on 
existing military hardware," as well as "budgetary 
constraints and safety concerns." In conclusion, the court 
stated: "A policy decision was made concerning the 
installation of steps on the [Underwater Tracking Range] 





The government's motion to dismiss was based on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of subject- 
matter jurisdiction. Because the Navy's motion was not 
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merely a facial challenge to the district court's jurisdiction, 
the court was not confined to allegations in the plaintiff's 
complaint, but could consider affidavits, depositions, and 
testimony to resolve factual issues bearing on jurisdiction. 
See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 549 F.2d 
884, 891-92 (3d Cir. 1977) (because a trial court's very 
power to hear a case is at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion, 
a court is free to weigh evidence beyond the plaintiff's 
allegations). We exercise plenary review over the 
applicability of the discretionary function exception. Fisher 
Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 




The Federal Torts Claims Act is a partial abrogation of 
the federal government's sovereign immunity that permits 
suits for torts against the United States. The Act, however, 
imposes a significant limitation by providing that no 
liability may be asserted for a claim "based upon the 
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform 
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not 
the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
 
The statute does not define "discretionary function or 
duty" and these terms have led to extensive litigation over 
the scope of the government's liability to tort claimants. It 
is clear that if the word "discretionary" is given a broad 
construction, it could almost completely nullify the goal of 
the Act. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio 
Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984) 
(exception "marks the boundary between Congress' 
willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States 
and its desire to protect certain governmental activities 
from exposure to suit by private individuals."). 
 
The statutory language does not apply to every situation 
in which there is an actual option to choose between 
courses of action or inaction. Rather, as the Supreme Court 
has stated, the discretion that is immunized from "second- 
guessing" in the tort suit context applies to "legislative and 
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and 
political policy." Id. at 814. 
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In Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 537 (1988), 
the Court explained: "The exception, properly construed . . . 
protects only governmental actions and decisions based on 
consideration of public policy." The reason for "fashioning 
an exception for discretionary governmental functions" was 
to "protect the government from liability that would 
seriously handicap efficient government operations." Varig 
Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814. 
 
In Berkovitz, the Court adopted a two-stage inquiry: First, 
a court must consider if "a federal statute, regulation or 
policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an 
employee to follow." 486 U.S. at 536. If so, "the employee 
has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive." Id. 
Consequently, there can be no lawful discretionary act. 
 
If circumstances imposing compulsion do not exist, a 
court must then consider whether the challenged action or 
inaction "is of the kind that the discretionary function 
exception was designed to shield." Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 
536. Again, the Court emphasized that the "discretionary 
function exception insulates the Government from liability 
if the action . . . involves the permissible exercise of policy 
judgment." Id. at 537. 
 
In United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991), 
the Court explained that for a plaintiff's claim to survive, 
the challenged actions cannot "be grounded in the policy of 
the regulatory regime." The Court stressed that the "focus 
of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in 
exercising the discretion conferred by statute or regulation, 
but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they 
are susceptible to policy analysis." Id. 
 
Gaubert noted another limitation on the exception, citing 
the hypothetical situation where an agency employee 
negligently drives an automobile in the course of his 
employment. Such action, although within the scope of 
employment, "cannot be said to be based on the purposes 
that the regulatory regime seeks to accomplish." 499 U.S. 
at 325 n.7. 
 
An examination of some of the situations where the 
discretionary function exception was applied may be helpful 
in understanding its scope. A federal agency decision to use 
 
                                5 
a spot-checking process in inspecting aircraft was an 
exercise of policy discretion. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814- 
16. The supervision of day-to-day activities of a failing thrift 
institution was based on the public policy considerations of 
protecting the federal savings and loan insurance fund and 
federal oversight of the thrift industry. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 
332. The decision of the Food and Drug Administration to 
refuse entry to suspected contaminated fruit was a 
discretionary action. Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 285. See also 
Sea Land Servs. v. United States, 919 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 
1990) (decision to use asbestos in construction of ships was 
a discretionary decision); General Public Utils. v. United 
States, 745 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1984) (action of Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission in not reporting safety information 
was discretionary).1 
 
Against the background of this brief survey of the general 
principles governing the discretionary function exception, 
we move to the consideration of the circumstances present 
here. 
 
The plaintiff's complaint focuses on the lack of a 
stairway, railing, and lighting that made the steep path an 
unsafe means of access to the trailer in the lower lot. 
Although the district court referred to the Navy's "decision" 
not to provide such improvements, it is not clear from that 
court's opinion whether there had been an actual decision 
to forego those measures, or whether the "decision" was 
simply inaction. In a deposition, an employee of Martin- 
Marietta stated that several years before plaintiff fell, the 
Navy had been asked on two or three occasions to build a 
stairway or install a handrail to ease travel down the path, 
but that these requests had been rejected. The government 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For a post-Gaubert commentary of the Federal Tort Claims Act, see 
Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: 
Federal Governmental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 871, 898 (1991) 
("The discretionary function exception should insulate all agency actions 
that, like congressional enactments themselves, reflect national policy"); 
William P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court's Recent Overhaul of the 
Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 Admin. 
L.J. Am. U. 1, 32 (1993) ("The discretionary function exception should 
immunize government decisions only when cases present policy 
questions that do not lend themselves to resolution by adjudication"). 
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produced testimony that no records of such requests were 
found in its files. 
 
The government submitted affidavits of several Navy 
personnel, pointing out what considerations would be 
germane in "a decision" to construct a stairway or handrail. 
The use of the article "a" appears to be deliberate and 
indicates some uncertainty in the record. We gather that 
there is thus a disavowal of a "decision in fact," or perhaps 
merely a lack of knowledge, on whether the Navy actually 
did decide not to take measures to reduce the hazardous 
conditions in the pathway. 
 
It would appear that in any event, the action or inaction 
goes more to the issue of negligence rather than whether 
the issue of policy discretion is implicated. "The test is not 
whether the government actually considered each possible 
alternative in the universe of options, but whether the 
conduct was of the type associated with the exercise of 
official discretion." Smith v. Johns Manville Corp., 795 F.2d 
301, 308-09 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d 
at 284 (we ask only if the nature of the action taken, or not 




The plaintiff's first line of attack is that the discretionary 
function exception is not really at issue because the Navy 
was bound to provide a stairway under the terms of the 
OSHA regulations. Under Berkovitz, regulations that give no 
options to a government agency take away the exercise of 
discretion. 486 U.S. at 536. If the OSHA regulations did 
apply, then the Navy could not rely on the discretionary 
function exception absent a statutory exemption. The 
district court held that by their own terms, however, the 
regulations cited by plaintiff applied to construction sites 
and not to an established facility like the Underwater 
Tracking Range. On the record before us, the district 
court's ruling was not erroneous. 
 
The district court also reviewed the evidence on the 
Navy's alternative theory that, by contract, Martin-Marietta 
was the entity responsible for the condition of the path to 
the trailer. The testimony of the Navy personnel did not 
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support the government's theory of delegation to an 
independent contractor. Based on that evidence, the district 
court properly rejected the delegation defense. We therefore 




In concluding that policy considerations were present in 
the Navy's action (or inaction), the district court relied on 
an affidavit submitted by the Navy's technical director for 
the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility. The affidavit 
stated that "[i]n evaluating a decision of whether to install 
an outdoor staircase and artificial lighting there are 
military, social and economic considerations involved." 
 
The pertinent factors were described as "a policy of 
insuring that United States Navy and allied forces can 
safely train with weapons in a realistic warfare 
environment." It was also alleged that sophisticated weapon 
systems could be damaged by construction near cables and 
conduits forming part of those systems. Social 
considerations included the safety of personnel using the 
facility and economic factors included budgetary 
constraints, procurement regulations, and the anticipated 
service life of the facility. 
 
The latter two categories in the affidavit are a 
compendium of considerations that conceivably could go to 
any decision by the Navy, from contracting for highly 
complex missiles to patching a hole in the floor of an office 
building. They are hardly the stuff that implicates the 
Navy's mission to provide a defense to the Nation or to 
enforce its diplomatic efforts. Consideration of tenets that 
sweep so broadly is of little use in the application of the 
discretionary function exception here. 
 
Certainly there is a distinction between contracting for 
the delivery of a weapons system costing millions or billions 
of dollars, and the material and labor costs of a few 
hundred dollars to construct a set of wooden steps, or even 
the lesser expenditures of erecting a barricade and directing 
personnel to use alternate routes. The safety of personnel 
cited by the Navy actually cuts against its position. Again, 
the Navy's proffered reasons are of such general application 
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as to provide no assistance in determining whether the 
discretionary function exception fits the situation here. 
 
The third factor -- that of possible damage to cables that 
are integral to the monitoring devices in the weapons range 
-- could be a factor affecting the Navy's mission. The 
difficulty with the Navy's position is that there is no 
evidence that cables are under or near the path, and 
potential damage to them from construction of a stairway is 
highly speculative. Based on this record, there is no 
indication that any cables would be endangered by the 
minor improvements involved here. Moreover, location of 
the cables would have no relevance at all to placing a 
barricade and diverting pedestrian traffic to an alternate 
route. The Navy's contention is undermined further by the 
apparent use of the path by personnel for many years 
without hazard to the cables. 
 
In emphasizing matters so remote from the 
circumstances of this case as to be useless, the affidavit 
employs the fire power of a sixteen-inch gun to attack an 
irritating gnat. This case is not about a national security 
concern, but rather a mundane, administrative, garden- 
variety, housekeeping problem that is about as far removed 
from the policies applicable to the Navy's mission as it is 
possible to get. In the words of the Supreme Court, the 
"challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be 
said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime." 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325. It is difficult to conceive of a case 
more likely to have been within the contemplation of 
Congress when it abrogated sovereign immunity than the 
one before us. 
 
The government cites a number of cases that it believes 
supports its position. We find them quite distinguishable 
from the matter at hand. In Ayer v. United States, 902 F.2d 
1038 (1st Cir. 1990), a civilian visitor was injured allegedly 
as a result of the Air Force's failure to attach a railing to a 
floor forming part of a missile launch site. The decision to 
omit railings was a deliberate choice to provide maximum 
flexibility in the event of a nuclear attack and, in addition, 
to maintain consistency of configuration with sites at other 
locations. Id. at 1043. The difference between that case and 
the one at hand is obvious. 
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In Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1993), 
the Court concluded that an agency decision as to the 
material used in guardrails alongside a highway came 
within the exception. The Court decided that the choice to 
replace a major element of a substantial public facility was 
a discretionary decision of resource allocation. Id. at 722. 
Notably, the agency's decision affected the construction of 
the entire highway. 
 
A somewhat similar case is Bowman v. United States, 820 
F.2d 1393 (4th Cir. 1987), where the National Park Service 
decided not to place a guardrail alongside the Blue Ridge 
Parkway. The Court indicated that the agency's decision 
involved a balancing of safety, aesthetic, and environmental 
reasons, as well as available financial resources. Id. at 
1395. Although that case somewhat favors the Navy's 
position here, we do not find it so similar in its factual 
background as to be a persuasive precedent for us. 
 
In Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1995), another 
automobile accident case, the plaintiff alleged that the Park 
Service allowed a road surface to become slippery and failed 
to post warning signs. The Court concluded that the 
decision to delay resurfacing of that road, in preference to 
others in need of repair, was a policy judgment to be made 
by the agency. Id. at 451. However, the Court decided that 
the government's failure to post warning signs was not a 
decision "fraught with public policy considerations" and, 
hence, was outside the exception. Id. See also Cassens v. 
St. Louis River Cruise Lines, Inc., 44 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 
1995) (coast guard inspectors use discretion when 
conducting inspections); Johns-Manville, 795 F.2d at 307- 
08 (government decision to sell asbestos "as is," without 
warnings, fell within exception). 
 
The government also relies on Hughes v. United States, 
110 F.3d 765 (11th Cir. 1997), where the plaintiff was shot 
by two assailants in the parking lot of a post office. The 
Court held that the decision of the postal authorities to 
limit security measures during hours when the post office 
was closed fell within the discretionary function exception. 
That case is easily distinguishable on its facts. 
 
We conclude that the discretionary function exception is 
not applicable in this case. Our holding on the issue of 
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jurisdiction, of course, is not intended to intimate any view 
on the liability of the government on the merits. The 
judgment of the district court will be reversed and the case 
will be remanded for further proceedings. 
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